Research Interests
My areas of specialization are in Philosophy of Action and Metaphysics and my areas of concentration are in Ethics, Bioethics, and Philosophy of Mind. I am interested in three broad interlocking areas of research: (1) the relationship between concepts in philosophy of action and philosophy of mind, (2) the metaphysics of natural and social properties, and (3) the plausibility of ethical naturalism. These topics might seem only distantly related; however, I think of them as unified by a certain philosophical methodology.
Metaphysics, as I practice it, is aimed at “reconciling” the manifest image, our pre-theoretic understanding of ourselves, with the scientific image, the post-theoretic understanding of ourselves. Furthermore, a genuine reconciliatory project should, I believe, aim to maintain the unique features of each “image,” insofar as this is possible. Mere reduction is not reconciliation; but neither is a Pollyannaish hope that our de facto beliefs are justified. In the long term, each of these research interests serves as a part of this overall reconciliatory project. They each cover the metaphysical underpinnings of key features of our pre-theoretic human experience—agency, reality, and value.
My first article, “Rejecting Pereboom’s empirical objection to agent-causation” (2017, Synthese), began exploring these ideas with respect to agency. In that paper, I argue for the compatibility of robust libertarian agency with our best empirical science. I expand on these ideas in my dissertation, “Action as Metaphysical Dependence,” which synthesizes features of both causal and non-causal action theory in order to articulate a unique non-reductive account of agency rooted in the concept of metaphysical dependence. I've most recently started investigating how consideration from ethics and philosophy of mind might help us better understand the relationship between group agents and individuals. The initial fruits of this research was published in 2022, under the title "Group Agents and the Phenomenology of Joint Agency" (2022, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.)
In the near future I aim to continue exploring issues in philosophy of action. In particular, I want to investigate the importance of dependence relations for the traditional free will debate and explore how we might philosophically think about the agency and phenomenology of group entities and joint actions.
Select Publications
"Group Agents and the Phenomenology of Joint Agency"(Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2022)
Co-authored with Michael Ebling |
Contemporary philosophers and scientists have done much to expand our understanding of the structure and neural mechanisms of joint action. But the phenomenology of joint action has only recently become a live topic for research. One method of clarifying what is unique about the phenomenology of joint action is by considering the alternative perspective of agents subsumed in group action.
By group action we mean instances of individual agents acting while embedded within a group agent, instead of with individual coordination. Paradigm examples are educational bureaucracies, corporations, and nation states. There is a phenomenological difference between agents whose actions are subsumed within a group action (“the university did X”) as compared to agents who act jointly (“we did x”). Attending to this difference clarifies what is phenomenologically distinctive about joint action. Appealing to an Aristotelian account of agency and to the metaphysical concept of weak emergence, we argue that what makes paradigmatic group action distinctive is the relative inaccessibility, un-revisability, and evaluative simplicity of the group agent’s goal(s) from the perspective of individual agents. This suggests that a distinctive feature of joint agency is the maintenance of a greater sense of individual agency. Put simply, joint agency is often experienced as an enhancement of the individuals’ agency precisely because our paradigmatic agential powers are extended intersubjectively as we act together. In contrast, group agency often involves a loss of the sense of agency, precisely because it is the emergent group agent that maintains the agential powers. |
"Rejecting Pereboom's Empirical Objection to Agent-causation" (Synthese, 2017)
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In this paper I argue that Pereboom’s (2001; 2007; 2014) empirical objection to agent causation fails to undermine the most plausible version of agent-causal libertarianism. This is significant because Pereboom concedes that such libertarianism is conceptually coherent and only falls to empirical considerations. To substantiate these claims I (i) outline Pereboom’s taxonomy of agent-causal views, (ii) develop the strongest version of his empirical objections (which I call the “Wild Coincidence” objection), and then (iii) show that this objection fails to undermine what I consider the most plausible view of agent-causal libertarianism, namely, reconciliatory integrationist agent-causalism. I then strengthen my criticism of Pereboom by responding to three objections to my view. I show that these objections, though initially challenging, fail to undermine my argument. I therefore conclude that, to this extent, agent-causal views remain a viable option in the contemporary free will debate.
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Select Presentations
"Non-Causalism as Metaphysical Dependence"
(APA-Pacific, 2018) |
Non-causal theories of action are not widely held among contemporary philosophers. This is, I argue, because contemporary non-causal accounts have a weakness that undermines their plausibility. These accounts rely on “experiential premises” in their arguments, which leaves them vulnerable to critiques concerning an explanatory gap between our experiences and the causally ordered natural world. A more plausible non-causal theory of action can be constructed, I contend, by relying instead on essential grounding relations to explain how actions can (i) be uncaused, (ii) belong to the agent, and (iii) fit with the causally ordered natural world. I first note how three contemporary non-causalists are vulnerable to the above critique. Second, I argue that non-causal accounts that rely on essential grounding both avoid those critiques and suggest an independently plausible theory of action. Third, I conclude by briefly canvasing questions a complete essential grounding theory should address.
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"Dispositional Essentialism and the Problem of Structural Properties"
(North Carolina Philosophical Society Conference, 2015) |
According to monistic dispositional essentialism, a view developed and defended by Bird (2012, 2007a, 2007b), laws of nature are grounded in fundamental properties that are essentially powers to manifest certain effects given certain stimulus conditions. Bird’s argument focuses on how the competing categorical account of properties is unsatisfactory because it depends on quiddities—an ineffable “thisness” that gives properties their essential nature. Bird frames this as a sharp dichotomy: either properties are essentially dispositional and thus defined by their modal powers or they are categorical and defined by their quiddities. Bird concludes that since quiddities present many unsavory metaphysical challenges the dispositional understanding of properties is correct.
I argue that dispositionalism and categoricalism are not the only ways to understand properties. Since Bird’s account has difficulties explaining non-causal fundamental properties I posit the existence of essentially structural properties whose essences entail necessary modal outcomes though these modal outcomes are not themselves part of the properties’ essence. I begin by reviewing Bird’s dispositionalist view and his argument against categoricalism. I then examine the difficulties that his account has with structural properties and meta-properties, paying particular attention to empirical challenges. Finally, I explain how an essentially structural account of fundamental properties meets those difficulties and thus is a viable alternative. |